Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

H. L. & Irene Leach dba Rusco Window Company
v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of
Utah et al : Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Herbert B. Maw; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Leach v. Industrial Comm. Of Utah, No. 7751 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1612

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

. H. L. & IRENE LEACH, dba RUSCO ·
WINDOW COMPANY,
Plailntijfs,

-vs.;r,,,.,BOARD OF REVIEW of the IN-~J)USTRIAL COMMISSION
OF
, UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF E
PLOYMENT SECURITY,

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

HERBERT B. MAW,
Attorneys for Plailntijfs
ood Appellants,
214 Boston Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Statement of Facts-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4
Assignments of Error -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6
Argument -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7
1. Plaintiffs' contentions that defendant erred in finding
that Franchise Dealers were employees________________________________ 7
(a) Tests of Employer-employee relationshiP---------·------------ 8
(b) Employed for wages------------------------------------------------------13
(c) Exemptions from the above Rule·-----------------------------------15
2. Plaintiffs' contention that defendant erred in finding
that Contract Installers were employees________________________________ 17
Conclusion ----------------------------------------------------------·---------------------------------20
CASES CITED
Angel v. Ind. Comm. 64 Utah 105; 228 P. 509......................... ~------12
Christean v. Ind. Comm. (Utah) 196 P. 2d 5,02 ________________________ 8, 11
Fuller Brush Co. v. Ind. Comm. 99 Utah 97; 104 P. 2d 201.. .. 13, 14
Gagoff v. Ind. Comm. 77 Utah 355; 296 P. 229 ______________________________ 12
Gibson v. Ind. Comm. 81 Utah 580; 21 P. 2d 536____________________________ 13
Kinder v. Ind. Comm. 106 Utah 448; 150 P. 2d 109________________________ 13
Lukes Sand and Gravel Co. v. Ind. Comm. 82 Utah 188;
23 P. 2d 22 5----------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
IYiiller v. Ind. Comm. 97 Utah 226; 92 P. 2d 342 ____________________________ 13
Murch Bros. Con. Co. v. Ind. Comm. 84 Utah 494;
36 P. 2d 105 3-----------------------------·--------------------------------------------------12
Parkinson v. Ind. Com. (Utah) 172 P. 2d 136.: ______________________________ 13
Sommerville v. Ind. Comm. (Utah) 196 P. 2d 718 __________________________ 12
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Ind. Comm. (Utah)
134 P. 2d 479·------·------------------------------------------------------------------------16
STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 42-2a-19-(j-(1)----------------------13, 15
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 42-2a-19-(j)-(5)( a), (b), (c) -------------------------------------------------------------;------------15, 20

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
I

tl

STATE OF UTAH

H. L. & IRENE LEACH, dba RUSCO ·

WINDOW COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,

-vs.,.
~

BOARD OF REVIEW of the INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,

Case No. 7751

Defend~t.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

The parties are referred to herein as follows: H. L.
& Irene Leach, doing business as RUSCO WINDOW

COMPANY, as plaintiffs, and BOARD OF REVIEW
of the INDUSTRIAL COM~IISSION OF UTAH, DEpARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, as defendant.
This is a petition for Writ of Review of an order of
the defendant affirming the appeal tribunal's decision
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4
directing the plaintiffs to pay into the State Unemployment Compensation Fund contributions on the earnings of Franchise Dealers, who make contracts for the
sale of Plaintiff's products, and of Contract Installers
of Plaintiff's products.

STATEMENT OF F'ACTS
Plaintiff is a partnership engaged in the business
of distributing Rusco Windows and other products manufactured by F. C. RUSCO COMPANY .of Cleveland,
Ohio. Substantially all of said distribution of said windows is done by the plaintiffs through Franchise Dealers
~n the manner described as follows :
Plaintiffs contract in writing with both individuals
and corporations, who are designated as Franchise
Dealers. Under the terms of said contracts, the Franchise Dealers are given the exclusive right to do business
within an assigned area, but are permitted to contract
for jobs involving 25 or more window openings in a
building in any area. The nature of the work done. by
said Franchise Dealers is that of contacting owners of
buildings that are being constructed or remodeled and
of entering into written agreements with them for the
sale and installation of Rusco Windows and Products.
These agreements are made in the names of the Franchise Dealers and the customers and are in no way binding upon the plaintiffs. They provide for the installation of Rusco Window and Products at prices listed by
the plaintiff. Franchise Dealers pay all of their own
expenses, work when and as they desire, are unsuper-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

vised by the plaintiff, hire their own help and pay the
salaries of their helpers, n1ake no reports to the plaintiffs, operate frmn their own hon1es or offices, and are
free from all control of the plaintiffs. They find their
own customers and are independent operators.
Prior to entering into a contract with prospective
Franchise Dealers, Plaintiffs offer them training. Said
training is optional on the part of the prospective dealers
and consists primarily of making the prospective dealers
acquainted with the nature of Rusco Windows and Products, and of instructing them regarding rules and regulations of the Federal Housing Administration. During
said period of training, which might last from one day
to several days--depending on the previous experience·
and the desire of the trainee~the trainee is considered
as an employee of the plaintiff and is paid a salary.
Mter a Franchise Dealer has made a contract with
a customer for the installation of Rusco Prt>ducts, he·
offers it to the plaintiffs for purchase. It is usually purchased by the plaintiffs when an investigation shows that
the credit rating of the customer is good, in which case
the Franchise Dealer becomes entitled to a percentage
of the contract price as commission. If the plaintiff does
not purchase it, the Franchise Dealer receives nothing
for his efforts because the plaintiffs are the exclusive
dealers of the windows and products of F. G. Rusco Company in this state and are therefore the only ones to
whon1 such contracts can be sold by Franchise Dealers.
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The F'ranchise Dealers have nothing to do with the
contracts they make with their customers after they are
sold to the plaintiffs. Thereafter the plaintiffs assume all
obligation under said contracts and at their own expense
install the windows and products covered by the contract.
They pay the Franchise Dealer's commission from the
1noney they collect from the customer after they have installed the windows and complied with the terms of the
agreement they had purchased from the Franchise
Dealer.

The installing work is done through contracts entered into between the plaintiffs and qualified carpenters
or installers. Said installers agree to install Rusco
Windows and Products in accordance with specifications
furnished by the plaintiffs and for a price agreed upon
by both parties. The installers agree to install said windows and products in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with said specifications and to furnish all of the
tools, equipment and transportation and labor necessary
to install and service the installations. Payments on
these contracts are made after the installations have been
completed. Installers receive no supervision while doing
their work, they work when and as long as they desire,
and are completely free of direction from the plaintiffs.
When the installations are completed their duties to the
plaintiffs end.
ASSIGNMENT OF' ERROR
The plaintiffs make the following Assignments of
Error:
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The defendant erred in finding that the Franchise Dealers who did business with plaintiffs during the
period from September 30, 1948 to December 31, 1950
were employees of the plaintiff and, being such, the
plaintiff must contribute to the State Unemployment
Compensation Fund on the basis of the amount paid as
commissions to said Franchise Dealers.
1.

2. The defendants erred in finding that the Contract Installers who did business with the plaintiffs during the period from September 30, 1948, to December 31,
1950 were employees of the plaintiff and, being such, the
plaintiffs must contribute to the State Unemployment
Compensation Fund on the basis of the amount paid them
on installation contracts.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANTS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FRANCHISE DEALERS WHO DID BUSINESS WITH THE PLAINTIFFS DURING THE PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER 30, 1948
TO DECEMBER 31, 1950 WERE EMPLOYEES OF THE
PLAINTIFF AND BEING SUCH, THE PLAINTIFFS MUST
CONTRIBUTE TO THE STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION FUND ON THE BASIS OF THE AMOUNT
PAID AS COMMISSIONS TO SAID FRANCHISE DEALERS.

This court has repeatedly held that the term "Employee" as defined by the Utah Unemployment Compensation Laws is broader in its scope than the Common
Law definition and than that of a mere master and servant relationship. In determining the liability of the
plaintiff for contributions to the unemployment fund,
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the tests being laid down in the act must be followed.
It is upon that premise that plaintiffs base their arguments.
In the, instant case the plaintiffs were not engaged
. in the same business as was carried on by the F'ranchise
Dealers. They solicited no business nor did they contact
prospects for the purpose of entering into contracts with
them for the installation of Rusco Products. They had
no lists of customers or prospects. The fields of their
service was entirely different from that of the Franchise
Dealers, who solicited contracts. The plaintiffs did not
solicit contractors. Their business was confined to the
installation of Rusco Products and the purchasilng of
contracts entered into between others in their own names.
Under such circumstances, it is difficult to conceive of
how an employer-employee relationship could exist between the plaintiffs and the dealers who did business
with them.

TESTS OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP

In Christean v. Industrial Commission (196 P 2d
502) this court stated certain matters of fact to be considered in determining whether, under the provisions of
the Unemployment Act one acting for another is a servant or an independent contractor~ They are as follows:
a. The extent of control which, by agreement, the
master may exercise over the details of the work. (In the
instant case· he could exercise no control.)
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b. 'Vhether or not the employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business. (Here F'ranchise Dealers
were not only engaged in a distinct business, but in one
which was entirely different from that of the plaintiffs.)
c. The kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under
the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision. (In the State of Utah, hundreds of persons
solicit business of various kinds from residents of the
state without any supervision or direction of any employer. A successful solicitor of business requires special
skills and a pleasing personality which cannot usually
be supplied by supervision.)
d. The skill required in the particular occupation.
(Acquiring contracts from prospects for Rusco products,
which are nationally advertised and are easily demonstrated as being a superior product, requires no unusual
skills which can be supplied or improved by supervision
or direction. Through a simple demonstration, the product sells itself.)
e. Whether the employer or the workman supplies
the instrumentalities, tools, and place of work for the
person doing the work. (The Franchise Dealers, not the
plaintiffs, furnish all of the supplies [even their OiWil
cards] the transportation, the labor and everything
needed in their business, operated out of their own offices
or homes, furnished their own business phones, and
take care of their own needs in the carrying on of their
businesses. Advertising is done on a National scale by
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F. C. Rusco Company, the manufacturer, not by the
plaintiffs. The plaintiff merely supplied the contract
forms to the dealers.)
f. The length of time for which the person is employed. (The life of the contract under which the F'ranchise Dealers operated was of indefinite duration and
was subject to cancellation by either party on five days'
written notice.)
g. The method of payment, whether by the time or
by the job. (Franchise Dealers received no p~y from
the plaintiff for their services. Their only compensation
was the commission they received from the sale of their
contracts to the plaintiffs.)
h. Whether or not the work is a part of the regular
business of the employer. (Here the plaintiffs were not
engaged in the business of soliciting contracts, so the
Franchise Dealers were not engaged in the regular business of the plaintiffs for they neither installed windows
or bought contracts.)
i. Whether or not the parties beli-eved they were
creating the relationship of master and servant. (The
contract entered into between the plaintiffs and the
Franchise Dealers specificly provided as foUows: "12. It
is understood and agreed that the franchise dealer shall
be an independent contractor and not an agent or employee of the Distributor." [Plaintiffs' Exhibit .A, §12.]
The witnesses testified that they did not believe they
were employees. [Tr. P. 15 L. 44-47; P. 30 L. 40-45] So
far as the record shows, no Franchise Dealer ever ap-
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plied for Unemploy1nent Benefits, which is evidence that
none of them considered themselves as being employees
of the plaintiff.)
The plaintiff in the Christean case, supra, was an
insurance agent. This court held in that case that criteria b, c, d, e, and h, listed above, indicated that the relationship between the plaintiff and the company he
represented was that of employer and employee but due
to the fact the contracting parties intended that the relationship be that of independent contractor and believed
the relationship so to be (criteria "i") and because the
company exercised no control over his activities (criteria
"a") the relationship was that of an independent contractor. In so deciding the court declared that "the extent of control that can be exercised by the principal
is by all cases and textbooks, the important test factor."
The evidence in the Christean case, supra, indicated
that the company exercised far more control over its
plaintiff than the plaintiff was able to exercise in the
instant case, for here the Franchise Dealers were completely free of supervision and control. The testimony
is undisputed that these dealers had no supervision, paid
their own expenses, were engaged in a different business
than the plaintiff, worked when and as they liked, hired
and paid for their own help, made no reports, operated
from their own homes or offices, and were completely
free to carry on their business as they chose, making
their contracts in their own names and with customers
of their own chosing.
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Though their contracts with the plaintiffs required
that Franchise Dealers shall not handle, sell or distribute
any other product (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A", §13) both
the plaintiffs (Tr. P. 18, L. 11) and the Franchise Dealer
(Tr. P. 24, L. 36-43) declared that it was permissible for
the dealers to handle other lines.
The above rule of law that the right to control is
the determining factor in cases such as this one is pointed
out by Justice Woolfe in the case of Sommerville v.
Industrial Commission (196 P. 2d, 718) in the following
language:
"It is now well settled in this jurisdiction
that the crucial -factor in determining whether an
applicant for worlanan's compensation is an employee or an independent contractor is whether or
not the person for whom the services were performed had the right to control the execution of
the work."
In the following Utah cases the court has reiterated
the "right to control" principle and in each held that
the control exercised by the principal was not such as
to require a finding of employer-employee, relationship.

Angel v. Ind. Comm., 64 Utah 105; 228 P.
509;
Lukes Sand and Gravel Co. v. Ind. Comm., 82
Ut. 188; 23 P. 2d 225;
Gagoff v. Ind. Comm., 77 Ut. 355; 296 P. 229;
Murch Bros. Con. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 84 Ut.
494; 36 P. 2d 1053;
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Gibson v. Ind. Com1n., 81 Ut. 580; 21 P. 2d
536;
Miller v. Ind. Comm., 97 Ut. 226; 92 P. 2d
342;
Parkinson v. Ind. Comm., Ut. 172 P. 2d 136;
Kinder v. Ind. Comm., 106 Ut. 448; 150 P. 2d
109.
EMPLOYED FOR WAGES

Before an employer can be required to contribute
to the State Unemployment Security Fund it must be
established that his employee "performed services and
earned wages." (Utah Code Annotated, 42-2a-19-(j) (1) )
On this point the Supreme Court of Utah has held that
the Unemployment Security Act applies only to:
"individuals who are employed for wages. It does
not cover every status of employment, nor does
it cover every individual who receives from another remuneration for work done. It covers only
individuals who have been, or are in employment
and who receive therefore wages as those two
terms are defined in the act." (Fuller Brush Co.
v. ln. Comm., 99 Ut. 97; 104 P. 2d 201)
The question in this case, therefore, resolves itself
into the proposition of whether the Franchise dealers
rendered personal services to the plaintiff for wages
or under a contract of hire. In the language of the court
in the Fuller Brush case:
"Did he render personal services~ If so, did
he or was he entitled to receive therefore remuneration based upon such personal service f'
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In the instant case Franchise Dealers (1) rendered
no personal service to the plaintiff. They worked for
themselves. They found their own customers, made contracts in their own names with their customers, paid
their own expenses, used their own equipment, provided
their own offices and telephone services, made no reports to the plaintiffs, worked when and as they wanted,
were free from all control and direction from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were in effect merely customers to
whom they sold their contracts.
(2) They received no wages or remuneration for
services rendered to the plaintiffs. In fact the only
income they received was from the sale of their contracts
to the plaintiffs. This court said in the Fuller Brush
case:
"The essential element of wages are that they
form a direct obligation against the employer,
in favor of the employee; that when the service
is performed the compensation, if any, accrues
and becomes payable regardless of the success or
failure of the undertaking; that any profits or
earnings over and above costs of the service accrues to the employer, and any loss as a result
of the undertaking or service must be borne by
the employer. It is not essential that the wage
move directly from the employer to the employee,
as where the employee works on commission, deducts his commission from a collection and remits the 'nets,' but it is essential that the remuneration accrues from the product or service of the
employer, and would accrue to him except for
the fact that the employee is entitled to retain or
receive it as remuneration under his contract of
hire."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lS'
Applying the above definition to the instant case
we find that the work or services performed by the
Franchise Dealers formed no "direct obligation against"
the plaintiff. They could have entered into a thousand
contracts with customers for the installation of Rusco
Windows and Products without obligating the plaintiff
in any way to pay them for what they did. Their remuneration is based, not on any services rendered, but
on the commission they receive from a sale of contracts
to the plaintiffs. Their work of entering into contracts
with their cu.stomers for the installation of Rusco Products impose no obligations on the plailntiffs to either
the Franchise Dealers or their customers. Their remuneration depends entirely on the results of a vendorvendee relationship between them and the plaiJntijfs.
Furthermore the evidence plainly shows that it was the
intentions of all of the parties-F'ranchise Dealers and
Plaintiffs alike-that an employer-employee relationship
should not be set up between them through the execution
of their contracts with each other.
EXEMPTIONS FROM THE ABOVE RULES
Even though the court should hoJd that the Franchise Dealers were performing services, as defined by
the Act, for the plaintiff "for wages or under a contract
for hire;" it is the plaintiffs' contention that they would
be exempt from paying the contributions in question
under the provisions of 42-2a-19-(j)-(5), (a), (b), (c),
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which this Honorable Court
has held was an exemption to the provisions of 42-2a-19-
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(j)-(1) and, therefore, exempted "certain persons who
otherwise come within the act as 'rendering personal
services for wages.'" (Singer Sewing Machine Co. v.
Ind. Oomm., Ut.134 P 2d 479)
"42-2a-19-(8)-(5) Services performed by an
individual for wages or under contract for hire,
written or oral, express or implied, shall be deemed to be employment subject to this act unless
and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the
Commission that " (A) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the
performance of such services, both under his contract of hire and in fact; and- "
(In the instant case as shown above all Franchise
Dealers are completely free from control and direction
by the plaintiffs over the performance of the services
they perform.)
" (B) such service is either outside the usual
course of the business for which such service is
performed or that such service is performed outside of all the places of business of the enterprise
for which such service is performed; and - "
(The services rendered by the Franchise Dealers are
both outside and different frmn the usual course of the
plaintiffs' business as well as from the nature of the
plaintiffs' business, and are performed entirely away
from all places of business of the plaintiffs; each Franchise Dealer maintaining his own separate offices and
contacting his own customers.)
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•• (C) such individual is customarily engaged
in an independently established trade, occupation,
profession, or business of the same nature as that
involved in the contract of service.-"
(Each Franchise Dealer is customarily engaged in an
independently established business of salesmanship.
Each, according to the testimony, is at libe~rty to carry
separate lines. The fact that the selling of contracts to
the plaintiffs was more to their advantage during the
period in question than the handling of several lines
might have been, in no way should modify the fact that
each one of them was actually and customarily engaged
in the independent business of salesmanship while they
were selling contracts to the plaintiff.)
DEFENDANT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CONTRACT INSTALLERS WHO DID BUSINESS WITH THE
PLAINTIFFS DURING THE PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER
30, 1948 to DECEMBER 31, 1950 WERE EMPLOYEES OF
THE PLAINTIFFS AND, BEING SUCH, THE PLAINTIFFS
MUST CONTRIBUTE TO THE STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION FUND ON THE BASIS OF THE AMOUNT
PAID THEM ON INSTALLATION CONTRACTS.

..

,.; ,
t ·.'~""'
.~

.

The second group of contractors who did business
with the plaintiffs and for whom the plaintiffs were
ordered to contribute to the State Unemployment Compensation Fund are the Contract Installers. The facts
relating to them are as follows :
After the plaintiffs purchase a contract from a
Franchise Dealer, they proceeded at once to carry out
the terms thereof which included the installation of
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Rusco Windows and Products. This work was done
through contractors. Plaintiffs as a rule made up the
windows in their shops and then contracted for the
installation of them.
Written contracts were entered into between the
plaintiffs and Installers. (Ptf's Ex. "B") These contracts required that the installers "shall provide and
furnish all tools, equipment and transportation necessary
to install and service the installations" of the products;
to do the work in a workmanshiplike manner, to assume
reponsibility for all materials turned over to them; and
"shall make every attempt to secure completion certificates on installation when his work is completed. "Payment for installations were to be made after the jobs
were completed. The parties agreed in the contract that
the installers were Independant Contractors and not
agents or employees of the plaintiffs, and that th econtract could be cancelled by either party on 5 days notice.
Plaintiff testified that he had no right of control
over the Installers, that they were free to work when,
how, and as they desired, that either standard or special
specifications were drawn for each job, and that the
installation price was agreed upon by the parties in
advance. ( Tr. P. 25) The Installers provided transportation for the Products to the premises where they
were to be installed, paid their orwn expenses, hired their
own help, furnished their own tools and equipment, and
did the jobs in accordance with the specifications and
without supervison. (Tr. P. 25)
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The amount of installation work available was
limited and did not, as a rule, require the full working
time of the Installers, consequently most of them did the
work in connection with other employment.
The Installers were in the main carpenters or mechanics. There was no evidence as to the extent that any
of them carried on similar activities as side line methods
of earning extra money. The only contacts the defendant
made with any of them, according to the record, was over
the telephone, and it appears that no inquiries were made
as to whether any of them were carrying on similar
businesses on the side. The evidence is undisputed,
however, that each Contract Installer operated as contractors when they did business with the plaintiffs as
installers.

'!..:.

Plaintiffs contend that under the rules of law discussed in the first section of this brief, the Contract
Installers were independent contractors and not employees of the plaintiffs, and were completely free of
all direction and supervision of the plaintiffs. They
worked according to written specifications on each installation job they did as most contractors do, and furnished
whatever labor, tools, equipment, and transportation
that was necessary to do the job. There was no criteria
of an employer-employee relationship between them and
the plaintiffs. They did not perform services for wages
or under any contract of hire written or oral, express or

implied, as defined in the Act.
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But even if the court should find that they were
employees of the plaintiff for wages or under a contract
of ~ire, they could be- readily classified under the exceptions provided in 42-2a-19-(j)-(5)-(A), (B), (C), Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, for
(A)

They were completely free from plaintiffs con-

trol.
(B) They did all their work away from the Plaintif's places of business.
(C) Each of them were customarily engaged in
independently established trades that were of the same
nature as would be required for the installation of Rusco
Products ; at times as employees of other companies and
at times as individual contractors on a full time or part
time basis but always within the fields of their related
independently established trades.

CONCLUSION
The same principles of law discussed herein in relation to Franchise Dealers apply to the Contract Installers. It is the plaintiffs' contention that in both,
those performing services did so as independant contractors and not as employees of the plaintiffs for whom
contributions to the State Unemployment Compensation
Fund must be made. Plaintiffs, therefore, pray that the
findings of the defendants that said Franchise Dealers
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and Contract Installers were employees of the plaintiffs
as defined by the act, be reversed.

~

~

Respectfully submitted,
HERBERT B. MAW,

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
214 Boston Bldg.,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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